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SECURITIES LAW-RULE 10b-5-ORAL EXECUTORY CONTRACT TO
PURCHASE SECURITIES HELD TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR
STANDING TO BRING PRIVATE 10b-5 ACTION, AND FRAUD OCCURRING
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE EXECUTORY CONTRACT HELD TO BE
"IN CONNECTION WITH" THE PURCHASE OF SECURITIES. Horst v.
W.T. Cabe & Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought suit in the United States District
Court, for the Southern District of New York, against a stock brokerage firm
and one of its employees.' Plaintiffs alleged that in December of 1975 they
orally instructed 2 defendants to purchase, for their account, 500 shares of
Crane Company stock at the then current market price. 3 Shortly thereafter,
plaintiffs were allegedly informed by defendants that the stock had been
purchased, when in fact the purchase order had never been executed.
4
According to the complaint, defendants later informed plaintiffs that due to a
clerical error the order had not been carried out, but that this would be
done. 5 Plaintiffs then sent defendants a check for $1,700 and were again
told that the stock had been purchased. 6 The complaint, however, averred
that this representation was false. 7 It was alleged that the actions of the
defendants "constituted 'a manipulative and deceptive device and contri-
vance' in violation of" s section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act) 9 and rule 10b-5 of the Security and Exchange Commission
(SEC).10 As a result of these actions, plaintiffs contended that they were
1. Horst v. W.T. Cabe & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
96,213 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1977).
2. Id. at 92,462-63. The instruction was apparently given over the telephone. Id. at 92,464.
3. Id. at 92,462. The market price of Crane Company stock at the time was 44l% per share.
Id. As of the date of the purchase order, defendants were alledgedly carrying a $20,427.22 "free




6. Id. This check raised plaintiffs' free credit balance to $22,127.22. Id.
7. Id. It was further alleged that, after defendants failed to send a written confirmation of
the purchase, plaintiffs demanded that defendants remit the free credit balance, but that defend-
ants "'converted' the sum 'maliciously,' in an effort to force plaintiffs to give defendants a
release from any potential liability." Id.
8. Id.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
id.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). The SEC promulgated rule 10b-5 pursuant to the
rulemaking authority conferred by § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. See Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). The rule provides:
(170)
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"lulled into believing that the . ..stock had been purchased ...until the
price of the stock had risen," 11 which allegedly caused them damage. 1 2
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the section 10(b)
claim, asserting that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue tinder that provision as
they "were neither 'purchasers' nor 'sellers' of securities."13 The district
court reftised to grant summary judgment on this ground, holding that an
oral executory contract to purchase securities provides a sufficient basis for
standing under section 10(b). 14  Furthermore, although the defendants had
not raised the issue, the court considered the question of whether the plain-
tiffs' complaint failed to state a claim under rule 10b-5 by not demonstrating
that the alleged deceptive practice was "in connection with" the purchase or
sale of a security, as required by the rule. 15 The court found this require-
ment satisfied, holding that where deceptive practices occurred while a con-
tract to purchase or sell securities was still executory, the deceptive practices
could be considered "in connection with" the purchase or sale of the se-
curity. 16  Horst v. W.T. Cabe & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96, 213 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1977).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national se-
curities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the stater.,ents made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
11. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,462.
12. Id. The court noted that, "[a]lthough not explicitly alleged in the complaint, it was
apparently plaintiffs' later purchase of the stock at 65V2 which resulted in their claimed mone-
tary damages" in the amount of $10,625. Id. at 92,462, 92,464 n.2.
Plaintiffs alleged two other causes of action, one based on federal and the other on state
law grounds. Id. at 92,462. It was alleged that by refising to return plaintiffs' free credit bal-
ance upon request, defendants had violated § 15(c) of the 1934 Act. Id. at 92,466-67. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 780(c) (1976). Plaintiffs' pendent state law claim was for breach of contract, based
upon the defendants' alleged failure to execute the order to purchase 500 shares of Crane Com-
pany stock. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,462.
13. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,462. The defend-
ants argued that plaintiffs' standing could not be premised upon an oral contract "lacking
documentary corroboration" as this would undermine the policy considerations which motivated
the establishment of the purchaser-seller requirement. Id. at 92,463. For a discussion of the
policy considerations underlying the purchaser-seller requirement of rule 10b-5, see note 31
infra.
Defendants accepted plaintiffs' factual allegations as true for the purpose of contesting
plaintiffs' standing to sue tinder § 10(b). [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,213, at 92,463 n.I. Defendants' version of the facts surrounding the purchase order dif-
fered considerably from the version set out in plaintiffs' complaint. Id. at 92,468.
14. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,463-64.
15. Id. at 92,464-66.
16. Id. at 92,466. In addition, the court found that plaintiffs' allegation that defendants re-
fused to return their free credit balance failed to state a claim under § 15(c) of the 1934 Act. Id.
at 92,466-67. See note 12 supra. The court did note, however, that defendants' alleged conduct
1978-1979]
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Although neither section 10(b) nor rule 10b-5 expressly provides for a
private cause of action, 1 7 the courts have recognized the existence of an
implied private right of action for violation of these fraud provisions."i The
courts have not, however, conclusively resolved the question of "the proper
selection and definition of those elements necessary for recovery in a 10b-5
action." 19
Concern with the rapid expansion of the scope of activities prohibited
by section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 20 prompted the establishment of restrictions
on the availability of private rights of action for violations of these provi-
sions z. 2  The first major restriction arose from the Second Circuit's decision
in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,2 2 which involved the threshold ques-
tion of standing to sue under rule 10b-5. 23  In Birnbaum, minority
shareholders were denied the right to sue under rule 10b-5 for alleged
breaches of fiduciary duties by a controlling shareholder and certain direc-
tors on the ground that the plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers of
securities.2 4  The court viewed rule 10b-5 as designed to protect only pur-
might be the basis for a pendent state law claim for conversion. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,467. Finally, the court refused to grant summary
judgment on the state law claim for breach of contract since there existed a factual dispute
which rendered the granting of a motion for summary judgment inappropriate. Id. at 92,468-69.
See notes 12 & 13 supra.
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). For the pertinent text of§
10(b) and rule 10b-5, see notes 9 & 10 supra.
18. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800, 802-03 (E.D. Pa.), modified on
other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to
this development in 1971 by stating: "It is now established that a private right of action is
implied under § 10(b)." Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971). For a discussion of Bankers Life, see The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV,.
52, 260-67 (1972).
19. Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule lob-5: Scienter, Reliance, and Plaintiff's
Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C.L. REV. 653, 653 (1975). See A. JACOBs, THE IMPACT
OF RULE 10b-5 § 36, at 2-2 (rev. ed. 1977). It has been noted that the elements necessary to
sustain a 10b-5 action may vary with the nature of the alleged fraudulent activity, and with the
nature of the plaintiff and the particular remedy sought. Id. at 2-2 to 2-4.
20. Note, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 148, 148-49 (1975) (citations omitted). See Manor Drug Stores v.
Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 147 (9th Cir. 1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), rev'd, 421
U.S. 723 (1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 158 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse
China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). See also
Gallagher, lob-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 80 DICK. L. REV. 1, 5
(1975).
21. See Gallagher, supra note 20, at 5.
22. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
23. See id. at 463-64; Allen, Rule 10b-5 and The Burger Court-Time to Reexamine the
Elements for a 10b-5 Action, 82 COM. L.J. 118, 119 (1977).
24. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 462-64 (2d Cir. 1952). The defendant
Feldmann, acting in his official capacity as president of Newport, rejected an offer for merger
with Follansbee Steel Corporation that would have been highly profitable to Newport, so that
he could sell his own shares of Newport stock to the defendant Wilport Company at twice the
then market value of the shares. Id. at 462. Feldmann subsequently resigned from his position
and was replace by defendant Gibson. Id.. Feldmann and Gibson allegedly made misrepresen-
tations to Newport's shareholders concerning the reasons for suspending negotiations for the
[VOL. 24: p. 170
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chasers or sellers of securities from fraud, "and as having no relation to
breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders resulting in fraud upon those
who were not purchasers or sellers." 25 Although the Birnbaum doctrine
was widely accepted by the federal courts, 26 certain exceptions to the strict
purchaser-seller requirement did evolve, 27 including an exception for plain-
tiffs who are parties to an agreement to purchase or sell securities which is
aborted as a result of a defendant's fraud.
2 8
Although the Birnbaum rule was frequently criticized as "an arbitrary
restriction which unreasonably prevents some deserving plaintiffs from re-
covering damages" 29 under rule 10b-5, 30 the Supreme Court accepted the
doctrine in 1975 in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drtg Stores. 31 In addition,
the Blue Chip Stamps court noted that an executory contract to purchase or
merger and the circumstances surrounding the sale of Feldmann's stock. 1d. The plaintiffs
claimed that these misrepresentations operated as a fraud upon Newport's shareholders in con-
nection with the sale of Feldmann's shares, and constituted a violation of rule lOb-5. Id.
25. Id. at 463.
26. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970). Simmons v. Wolfson, 428
F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971): City Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith v.
Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970): Jensen v. Voyles, 393
F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1968): Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 977 (1967).
27. See, e.g., James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944, 945 (6th Cir. 1973) (beneficiaries
of trust which sold stock have standing); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 170-73 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970) (strict standing requirement relaxed where plaintiff seeks to
enjoin deceptive practices which could lead to completed purchases or sales) Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 798 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822
(1970) (plaintiffs selling stock tinder threat of divestiture action under antitrust laws have stand-
ing): Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 633-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967) (plaintiffs required to buy or sell stock by statute regulating short form mergers are
"purchasers" and "sellers"): Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d
Cir. 1967) (purchaser or seller requirement abandoned in private action for injunctive relief
from corporate mismanagement); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967) (standing allowed in derivative suit based on merger transac-
tion). See also Gallagher, supra note 20, at 8-19: Note, supra note 20, at 150.
28. See, e.g., Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Stipp. 715, 718-19
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (standing based on breach of agreement for sale of stock to plaintiffs): Goodman
v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 444-45 (N. D. III. 1967) (allowing standing where defend-
ant fraudulently failed to carry out purchase order). Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F.
Supp. 668, 673-75 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (fraudulent failure to execute
sell order as basis for standing). But see Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 346
(9th Cir. 1972) (denying standing tinder aborted purchaser-seller exception where contractual
relationship between plaintiff and defendant was lacking).
29. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 (1975).
30. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of The Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
10-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268, 275-76 (1968); Whitaker, The Birnbaomn Doctrine: An Assessment,
23 ALA. L. REN'. 543, 585-86 (1971); Comment, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbanmn: The Case of
the Missing Remedy, 24 HASTING L.J. 1007, 1034-37 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 10b-5 Standing
Under Birnbaum]: Comment, The Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule 10lb-5,
14 VILL. L. REv. 499, 501-02 (1969). Some courts and commentators even predicted that the
doctrine would be abandoned. See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Stipp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Low-
enfels, supra, at 275-77: Comment, supra, at 515.
31. 421 U.S. 723, 731-55 (1975). The Court's principal reasons for accepting the Birnbaum
doctrine were as follows: 1) the lower courts had been applying the doctrine for over 20 years,
and the failure of Congress to broaden § 10(b) indicated its acquiescence in the interpretation of
1978-1979]
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sell securities is sufficient for purchaser-seller standing tinder the doctrine. 32
The Court declined, however, to elaborate on the type of contract necessary
to satisfy the doctrine or on the specific question of whether an oral contract
to purchase or sell securities would provide standing. 33
While the question of whether an oral contract to purchase or sell se-
curities is sufficient to establish purchaser-seller standing has rarely been
addressed by the courts, 34 the Second Circuit has at least suggested that it
would answer this question in the affirmative. 35 Moreover, in Opper v.
Hancock Securities Corp.36 and Desser v. Ashton, 37 the United States Dis-
10(b) embodied in the doctrine; 2) other provisons of the 1934 Act and the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1976), which expressly provided remedies for nonpurchasers and
nonsellers, indicated that Congress intended to limit the availability of remedies tinder the
securities laws to purchasers and sellers unless it expressly provided otherwise; and 3) the
Birnbaum rule would limit the number of vexatious "strike suits" that would likely result from a
more expansive interpretation of rule 10b-5. 421 U.S. at 733-48.
In its discussion of this third consideration, the Court indicated that it was particularly
concerned with the fact that proof of nonpurchasing and nonselling plaintiffs' claims would have
to be made largely by uncorroborated oral evidence. Id. at 746. Such a plaintiff would be
testifying "that he decided not to purchase or sell stock." Id. (emphasis supplied by the Court).
In such a case, the Court noted that "[t]he jury would not even have the benefit of weighing
the plaintiff's version against the defendant's version, since the elements to which the plaintiff
would testify would be in many cases totally unknown and unknowable to the defendant." Id.
The majority further indicated that since Congress had not legislated with respect to a
private cause of action tinder rule 10b-5, it was the responsibility of the courts to define the
scope of the judicially created Birnbaum doctrine. Id. at 748-49.
32. 421 U.S. at 750-51. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied primarily on § 3(a)(13)
and (14) of the 1934 Act. Id. at 750-51 & n.13, citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13), (14) (1976). Section
3(a)(13) provides: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1976). Section 3(a)(14) provides: "The terms 'sale'
and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14)
(1976).
The plaintiffs in Blue Chips Stamps were denied standing because they neither actually
purchased or sold securities, nor had any "contractual right or duty to purchase ... securities."
421 U.S. at 727, 751. Rather, the plaintiffs were merely offerees who declined to purchase the
offered shares in reliance on a misleading prospectus. Id. at 726-27, 751.
33. See 421 U.S. at 749-51.
34. See Note, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 858, 863 (1976).
35. See Dopp v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 461 F.2d 873, 875 & n.3, 879-81 (2d Cir. 1972).
36. 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 357 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966). In Opper, an investor
sued a brokerage corporation for failing to sell securities owned by him pursuant to a verbal
order to sell. 250 F. Snpp. at 670-71. The defendant had falsely represented to the plaintiff that
it was attempting to locate a purchaser for his stock, and at the time was selling shares of the
same stock on its own account. Id. at 672-73. The court, without considering the question of the
sufficiency of an oral contract as the basis for standing, held that the plaintiff could bring a rule
10b-5 action. Id. at 673.
37. 408 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The plaintiffs in Desser had alleged fraud in con-
nection with an alleged oral agreement with the defendants for the supposed purchase of certain
securities by the plaintiffs which never actually took place. Id. at 1175. The court specifically
found that an oral contract satisfied the purchaser-seller requirement, and that it was not neces-
sary that a contract satisfy the statute of frauds in order to support an action under rule 10b-5.
Id. The court supported its holding by noting that no case had been located which supported
the proposition that an oral or unenforceable contract could not be the basis for a 10b-5 action.
Id. at 1175-77. In response to the contention that the Supreme Court opinion in Blue Chip
[VOL. 24: p. 170
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trict Court for the Southern District of New York permitted the plaintiffs to
pursue their rule 10b-5 claims even though the actions were grounded upon
oral contracts to purchase and sell securities.
Once standing to sue Linder rule 10b-5 has been established, 38 plaintiffs
have traditionally been required to demonstrate that the alleged fraud or
deceptive practice was causally related to the alleged injury. 39 The causa-
tion requirement was satisfied if the plaintiff met the test of reliance 40 (or
Stamps "contains strong language concerning the dangers of parol evidence in the proof of 10b-5
claims," the court distinguished the situation presented in Desser. Id. at 1176. The court
reasoned:
There the Supreme Court was discussing the situation where a nonpurchaser of securities
alleges not that he had an oral contract to purchase securities but simply that he himself
refrained from purchasing due to reliance on an alleged misrepresentation or omis-
sion .... The hypothetical situation there is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar,
at least because of the availability of the testimony of other witnesses to confirm or con-
tradict the oral testimony of the plaintiffs.
Id. (citation omitted). See note 31 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Desser, see
Note, supra note 34.
See also Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), in
which a cause of action tinder rule 10b-5 was denied, not because the plaintiff was relying upon
an oral contract to purchase securities for standing, but rather because plaintiff had failed to
factually support its claim, in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, that
there was an oral agreement and fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.
Id. at 719-20.
38. See notes 17-37 and accompanying text supra.
39. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 & n.ll (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1974); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d
787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 67
F.R.D. 468, 478-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp.
715, 719-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The causal relationship must be demonstrated in order for the fraud to be considered
"in connection with" the purchase or sale as required by § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). For the text of the these provi-
sions, see notes 9 & 10 supra. For cases equating the "in connection with" requirement with
the causation requirement, see, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 & n.23 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374,
380-81 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir. 1974).
40. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965). The List court explained that abandonment of the reliance requirement would read the
tort law principle of causation in fact out of rule 10b-5. 340 F.2d at 463. The court's analysis
indicates the similarity between a 10b-5 action and the common law tort action for deceit, which
requires damage to the plaintiff as a result of reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation. See
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). See also
Allen, supra note 23, at 118 & n.5; Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under
SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 584-86 & n.3 (1975). In Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen,
513 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975), the court explained that the reason
for the reliance requirement was "to restrict the potentially limitless thrust of Rule 10b-5 to
those situations in which there exists a causation in fact between the act and injury." 513 F.2d
at 238-39 (citations omitted). This suggests that the reliance requirement may be another man-
ifestation of the concern over the rapid expansion of the private 10b-5 cause of action. See notes
20 & 21 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted that the requirement of reliance "is
used interchangeably with the concept of 'causation.' " Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 67
F.R.D. 468, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (citations omitted).
1978-1979]
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"transaction causation" 41) set out in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 4 2 under
which the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's "misrepresentation is a
substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in [the
recipient's] loss." 4a
The general rule has been that the causation requirement can never be
satisfied where the alleged fraudulent activity occurs after the completion of
the purchase or sale transaction. 44  One district court has suggested, how-
ever, that there need only be "some temporal relationship" between the
fraudulent practice and the securities transaction. 45 The precise question of
whether causation can be established where the fraud occurs during the
pendency of an executory contract has rarely arisen. 46  The Ninth Circuit
41. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 & n.ll (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
42. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
43. 340 F.2d at 462, quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938). See Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822
(1970); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The traditional causation requirement has been modified in cases involving nondisclo-
sure rather than affirmative misrepresentation. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972), where the Supreme Court held that, under circumstances "involving
primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All
that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important in [the decision to sell securities]." Id., citing Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom, Coastes v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); A. BROM-
BERG, SECURITIES LAW, FRAUD-SEC RULE 10b-5 §§ 2.6, 8.6 (1967). 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 3876-80 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). The Court further noted that the "obligation to
disclose and th[e] withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in
fact." 406 U.S. at 154, citing Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir.
1970). Accord, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d
Cir. 1974); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 4;8, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("in a nondisclo-
sure case 'reliance' has little if any rational rule"). See also Note, supra note 40, at 590-92. It
should be noted that, in connection with the question of relaxing the reliance requirement, the
Second Circuit has indicated that "[b]efore there may be a violation of the securities acts there
need not be present all of the same elements essential to a common law fraud." Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir. 1974), quoting Globus
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970).
44. See, e.g., Raschio v. Sinclair, 486 F.2d 1029, 1030 (9th Cir. 1973) (no causation where
plaintiffs purchased securities two months prior to issuance of prospectus which allegedly vio-
lated rule 10b-5); Clinton Hudson & Sons v. Lehigh Valley Coop. Farms, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 420
425 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (no causation where fraudulent activity allegedly occurred five years after
purchase of stock as the fraud could not have "touched" the acquisition of stock); Pepsico, Inc.
v. W.R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (fraud practiced after a purchase
or sale is not "in connection with" purchase or sale of a security).
45. See Clinton Hudson & Sons v. Lehigh Valley Coop. Farms, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 420 (E.D.
Pa. 1977), where the court stated that "[o]rdinarily, specific dates of circumstances giving rise to
or constituting fraud are not significant, so long as there is some temporal relationship between
the events and the purchase of stock." Id. at 425. The court did not define the limits of the
term "some temporal relationship," but merely held that fraud occurring five years after a com-
pleted purchase was not causally related to that purchase. Id.
46. But see Ohashi v. Verit Indus., 536 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1004 (1976); Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1976).
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dealt with that issue in Ohashi v. Verit Industries,47 and held that if the
contract by which the plaintiff acquired stock of the corporate defendant
"was still executory when the fraudulent activities occurred and if those acts
affected the unperformed part of the bargain, the fraud may be 'in connec-
tion with the sale or exchange of any securities.' "48 Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit, in Davis v. Davis,49 recognized a plaintiff's right to injunctive relief
under rule 10b-5 where the fraud occurred during the pendency of an
executory contract to sell stock, 50 and found that the fraud sufficiently
"touched" the contract to be "in connection" with a sale of securities. 51
The Horst court's analysis of the issues raised by the defendants' motion
for summary judgment initially focused upon the question of the plaintiffs'
standing to sue based upon the oral purchase order. 52 The court noted that
plaintiffs predicated their standing on section 3(a)(13) of the 1934 Act, "which
defines the terms 'buy' and 'purchase' to include 'any contract to buy,
purchase, or otherwise acquire.' "53 Since the defendants had argued that
standing based upon an oral contract "would undermine the policy consider-
47. 536 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976). Ohashi involved an ex-
change of plaintiff's stock for stock in the defendant corporation. Id. at 851. As part of the ex-
change, the plaintiff agreed not to transfer his stock until certain restrictions upon its transfer
were removed. Id. at 851-52. After the actual exchange of the stock, the defendant made false
representations to the plaintiff that steps were being taken to remove the restrictions, allegedly
as part of a deceptive plan to keep the plaintiff's stock off the market. Id. at 852. The court
recognized that, had the fraud occurred after the exchange was completely executed, causation
could not have been established. Id. at 853. For examples of cases holding that the causation
requirement cannot be met where the fraud occurs after the completion of the purchase or sale,
see note 44 supra. The Ohashi court found, however, that under state law Verit had an implied
contractual duty to use good faith in attempting to remove the restrictions, and the contract
remained executory until it performed this duty. 536 F.2d at 853 (citations omitted). The court
thus concluded that at least some of the misrepresentations had been made while the contract
had not yet been fully performed. Id. at 853-54.
48. 536 F.2d at 853. The Ohashi court found that the plaintiff had satisfied this test of
causation. Id. at 854. The court did note, however, that not every breach of contract constitutes
actionable fraud within the meaning of rule 10b-5. Id., citing A.T. Brod. & Co. v. Perlow, 375
F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1967).
49. 526 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1976).
50. Id. at 1287-89.
51. Id., citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
52. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,463. Before
dealing with the issues raised by the defendants, the court considered whether there was a
suflcient allegation of scienter in the plaintiffs' complaint, an issue which the defendants had
not raised. Id. at 92,462. It was noted that proof of the defendant's "mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" is a necessary element of a 10b-5 action. Id. at
92,462-63, quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976). Noting that
plaintiffs had not alleged that defendants had acted with any of the "states of mind indicative of
fraud," the court concluded "that plaintiffs ha[d] failed to state a claim under § 10(b) in the
complaint as [then] drafted." [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 96,213, at 92,
463. However, since it appeared to the court that it may have been plaintiffs' intention to assert
a cause of action in fraud, they were granted leave to amend the complaint to include the
proper allegation of scienter. Id. The court proceeded with its analysis on the assumption that
an adequate amended complaint would be filed. Id.
53. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,213, at 92,463, quoting 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1976) (emphasis supplied by the court).
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ations which motivated the Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps,"
the court found it necessary to examine that decision.
54
The court found that the primary concern of the Blue Chip Stamps
Court was that granting standing to nonpurchasers and nonsellers of se-
curities "would render the 10b-5 cause of action both unmanageable and
susceptible of abuse." 55  Moreover, the court noted the Blue Chip Stamps
Court's specific holding that holders of contractual rights to purchase or sell
securities had standing as purchasers or sellers under rule lob-5 by operation
of sections 3(a)(13) and (14) of the 1934 Act. 5 6  Those sections, it was ob-
served, did not distinguish between oral and written contracts, which led
the Horst court to conclude that "[t]he standing of a contractual purchaser or
seller . . . derives from the express wording of [the] statute, whether the
underlying arrangement be verbal or written."57
Despite its conclusion that the policy considerations expressed in Blue
Chip Stamps 5 had "little or no applicability" to a plaintiff within the
"statutorily defined class of purchasers and sellers," 59 the court nonetheless
considered the defendants' policy argument.6 0  It was determined that the
policy considerations had no merit in a situation such as that presented in
Horst because where a plaintiff has alleged some contractual relationship
with the defendant, even if oral, the trier of fact can weigh that version of
the facts with the version presented by the defendant. 61  Such an opportu-
nity is not available where no contractual relationship is alleged.
6 2
It was further noted in the Horst decision that the granting of standing
based upon an oral contract to purchase or sell securities was not entirely
without precedent. 63  Finally, the court stated that it "would be loath, in
54. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,463. See note 13
and accompanying text supra.
55. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,463. The Court,
reiterating the concerns expressed in Blue Chip Stamps, noted that "[l]awsuits involving such
plaintiffs would present serious difficulties in terms of assessing damages; would necessarily
require resort to uncorroborated oral testimony as the means-perhaps the sole means-to
demonstrate plaintiffs' reliance sipon alleged fraudulent representations; and would provide fer-
tile ground for the extortion of settlements of unmeritorious claims." Id. For a discussion of the
treatment of these issues by the Blue Chip Stamps Court, see note 31 supra.
56. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,463, citing Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750-51 (1975); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13), (14)
(1976). See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
57. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,463.
58. See notes 31 & 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
59. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,463-64.
60. Id. at 92,464.
61. Id.
62. Id., citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 746 (1975). The
court also cited the Desser decision, in which a similar determination was made two years
earlier by the district court. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at
92,464, citing Desser v. Ashton, 408 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For a discussion of
Desser, see note 37 supra.
63. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCI-I) 96,213 at 92,464, citing Desser
v. Ashton, 408 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Horst court, quoting Desser, expressed the
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view of the broad, remedial purposes of the Act, to deny plaintiff stand-
ing" 64 where a defendant with the status of plaintiffs' agent 65 and broker
had allegedly engaged in a fraudulent practice.
66
After establishing that the plaintiffs did have standing, the court consid-
ered whether the complaint demonstrated a sufficient causal connection be-
tween the defendants' conduct and plaintiffs' alleged injury. 6 7 According to
the court, the complaint indicated that the fraud did not induce the forma-
tion of the contract, but instead "occurred during the course of the parties'
contractual relationship." 68 Recognizing that the traditional reliance, or
"transaction causation," test could not be satisfied under such cir-
cumstances, 69 the court considered the essential inquiry to be whether the
lack of transaction causation "in its normally understood sense" was "fatal to
the 10b-5 claim." 70
view that "'the anti-fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5 are to be liberally and flexibly construed so
as to further the aim of Congress to protect investors from fraud and maintain a free and open
securities market' . . . and, further, that '[i]t has been specifically held that this admonition
should apply to the term "contract" as defined in the 1934 Exchange Act . . . and to the
"'purchaser-seller" requirement."' [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $
96,213, at 92,464, quoting Desser v. Ashton, 408 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (cita-
tions omitted). For a discussion of Desser, see note 37 supra.
64. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,464.
65. Id. The court's characterization of defendants' status apparently was based upon the
Practice Commentary to § 8-319 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code, N.Y. U.C.C. §
8-319 (62-1h McKinney 1964). The Practice Commentary provides in part:
The vast majority of transactions in securities take place on the organized markets
and are carried on through brokers acting as agents for sellers and buyers respectively.
Where the broker acts as agent the contract between broker and customer is not "for
the sale of securities." It is a contract of employment ...
Practice Commentary to N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-319 (62- McKinney 1964). As plaintiffs' agent, the
defendants were found to have been tinder an obligation to obtain the best possible market
price in purchasing the ordered stock. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,213, at 92,464 (citations omitted).
66. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,464. The court
considered "[d]efendants', or any broker's, misfeasance in the execution of his customer's verbal
order" to be "an act intrinsic to the post-distribution trading process and thus of central concern
tinder the 1934 Act." Id.
67. Id. The court, rather than the defendants, raised the causation issue. Id.
68. Id. at 92,464-65.
69. Id. at 92,465. The test of reliance was stated in the Horst opinion as "whether the
misrepresentations were a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which re-
suited in the plaintiff's loss." Id., citing Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d
787, 797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,
462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D.
468, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For a discussion of the traditional reliance test, see notes 41-43 and
accompanying text supra.
70. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,465. The court
noted that the reason for requiring a showing of reliance is to insure that the defendant's fraud
actually caused the alleged injury. Id., citing Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234,
238-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
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Where the alleged fraud occurs after a completed purchase or sale
transaction "which is itself the occasion for the plaintiff's economic loss," the
court conceded that the traditional causal relationship could not possibly be
established.71 The court was particularly influenced, however, by the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Ohashi v. Verit Industries,72 which it considered to be
"persuasive authority for the proposition that where the underlying transac-
tion is a contract for purchase or sale, the fraud need not preceed the forma-
tion of the contract, or constitute its inducement, for the requisite transac-
tional nexus to be present." 73 The Horst court also relied on Davis v.
Davis, 74 in which the Fifth Circuit found causation where the deceptive
practice followed the formation of the contract, 75 as support for its conclu-
sion that the causation requirement was satisfied in the instant case. 76  It
was noted that in both Ohashi and Davis the plaintiff's loss resulted from
the defendant's fraudulent breach of contract, rather than from the formation
of the contractual relationship itself.77 The court extracted from these two
cases the principle that where the denfendant's fraudulent practices, even
though not the inducement for the contract, are "intrinsic" to the stock
transaction in question and are the direct cause of the plaintiff's damages,
78
the policy underlying the transaction causation requirement79 would appear
to be fully satisfied. 80 The court concluded that "loin the basis of the au-
thorities cited, plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient causational nexus between
defendants' fraud and their own injury to withstand the dismissal of the
complaint." 81
71. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,465, citing Ras-
chio v. Sinclair, 486 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1973); Clinton Hudson & Sons v. Lehigh Valley Coop.
Farms, 73 F.R.D. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
72. 536 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976). For a discussion of Ohashi,
see notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text supra.
73. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,466. The court
engaged in an extensive analysis of the factual situation in Ohashi, noting that the fraud neither
induced the formation of the agreement to exchange stock, nor occurred contemporaneously
with its formation. Id. at 92,465-66. See note 47 supra. It observed that the Ninth Circuit had
nevertheless found that the causation requirement was satisfied, since "the contract by which
[the plaintiff] acquired [his] stock was still executory when the fraudulent activities. occurred
... [and] .. . those acts affected the unperformed part of the bargain." [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,466, quoting Ohashi v. Verit Indus., 536
F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
74. 526 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1976).
75. Id. at 1287-89. See text accompanying notes 50 & 51 supra.
76. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,466, citing Davis
v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1976). The Horst court did recognize that the plaintiff in
Davis, unlike plaintiffs in Horst, sought only injunctive relief and not damages. [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,466. It nonetheless considered the
Davis decision to be "instructive in the present context." Id.
77. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,466.
78. Id. Only in Ohashi did the court consider it to be clear that the defendant's fraudulent
conduct was the direct cause of the alleged damages. Id.
79. The Horst opinion again noted that the reason for requiring transaction causation was to
insure a causal relationship between the fraudulent act and the injury. Id. See note 70 supra.
80. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,466.
81. Id.. The court reached this conclusion after finding that Horst, like Ohashi and Davis,
involved fraud which occurred "during the pendency of an executory contract between the
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It is submitted that the Horst court has taken a well reasoned approach
to the issue of standing to sue under rule 10b-5 based upon an oral contract
to purchase or sell securities. Support for the court's position can be found
in the Supreme Court's admonition to read rule 10b-5 liberally and flexi-
bly, 82 which has been applied to the purchaser-seller requirement. 83 There
is no doubt that standing may be based upon an executory contract to
purchase or sell stock, 84 and there is authority for the position that a plaintiff
has standing where that contract is an oral one.8 5 The Horst court's deter-
mination that sections 3(a)(13) and (14) of the 1934 Act do not distinguish
between oral and written contracts 86 is, it is submitted, a strong basis for
the decision on the issue of standing.8 7 Finally, it is suggested that the
court's distinction as to the dangers of oral evidence in the factual situation
presented in Horst as compared to cases in which no contractual relationship
is alleged 88 is indeed a valid one.
parties for the purchase or sale of securities," and that plaintiffs had alleged that defendants'
fraudulent breach of contract and misrepresentations were the direct cause of their damages. Id.
For a discussion of the court's disposition of plaintiffs' other federal and state law claims, see note 16
supra.
82. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971), in which
the Supreme Court stated that "[slection 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and
restrictively." Id. See also Lanza v. Drexel & Co. 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973); Com-
merce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); A. JACOBS,
supra note 19, § 38, at 2-25.
83. See, e.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 346 n.12 (9th Cir. 1972);
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1970); Desser v. Ashton, 408 F. Supp.
1174, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
84. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750-51 (1975); Com-
merce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715, 718-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Goodman v.
H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 444-45 (N.D. I11. 1967); Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250
F. Supp. 668, 673-75 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966). See also notes 28 & 32 and
accompanying text supra.
85. See Dopp v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 461 F.2d 873, 875 & n.3, 879-81 (2d Cir. 1972);
Desser v. Ashton, 408 F. Supp. 1174, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250
F. Supp. 668, 673 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 357 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966). See also notes 34-37 and
accompanying text supra. One commentator has adopted the position that an enforceable con-
tract should not be required for 10b-5 standing:
If X resorts to a fraudulent device to escape a contractual obligation to buy Y's securities,
the device would seem no less unlawful under Rule 10b-5 because the contract later
turned out to be unenforceable on account of some illegality on the part of Y. Just as not
every breach of contract violates the rule . . . , it is equally true that there can be a
violation of the rule, which is subject to the usual public sanctions, without an enforceable
contract.
3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1473 n.102 (2d ed. 1961). But see Note, supra note 34, at
866-67 (rule 10b-5 would not be "eviscerated" if standing based on oral contracts were dis-
allowed).
86. See text accompaning note 57 supra.
87. Justice Powell noted in Blue Chip Stamps that "[t]he starting point in every case in-
volving construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). It is submitted that had the Horst
court concluded that standing could not be based upon an oral contract, it would have effec-
tively added the term "written" to the term "contract" in the statutory language of §§ 3(a)(13)
and (14) of the 1934 Act. For the text of §§ 3(a)(13) and (14), see note 32 supra.
88. See notes 54 & 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
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To support its conclusion on the issue of causation, the Horst court
relied primarily on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Davis and the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Ohashi.S9  It is suggested that Davis does not provide firm
ground upon which to base the court's holding as to causation as that case
involved a claim for injunctive relief.90 Since the purchaser-seller require-
ment has been relaxed in private rule 10b-5 suits in which only an injunction
was sought, 9 1 it is reasonable to assume that rule lOb-5 actions involving
injunctions may generally have less stringent requirements than those in
which damages are sought, and, therefore, that the two classes of cases
should not be analogized.
9 2
Rather than expressly adopting either of the tests of causation employed
in Ohashi93 and Davis,9 4 it is submitted that the Horst court formulated a
test of its own. The court stated that the causation requirement would be
satisfied where it could be established that defendant's fraudulent breach of
the contractual terms caused the plaintiff's economic loss, and was thus "in-
trinsic" to the securities transaction and the direct cause of the plaintiff's
damages. 95 This test is susceptible to two criticisms. First, the court failed
to elaborate on the meaning of the word "intrinsic" as used in the causation
test.96 It is unclear from the language employed by the court whether fraud
is to be considered "intrinsic" to a securities transaction whenever a plaintiff
suffers a loss as the result of the defendant's fraudulent breach of the con-
tractual terms, or whether some additional standard is embodied in the
word "intrinsic." Second, it is submitted that the Horst court's causation test
does not squarely confront the causation issue. Stripped to its elements, the
test, it is suggested, requires a plaintiff to allege that while the contract to
purchase or sell securities was still executory, the defendant's fraudulent
breach of the contract directly caused the plaintiff's injury. 97 If the function
89. See notes 72-81 and accompanying text supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 49 & 50 supra.
91. See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970)
(plaintiff who was neither purschaser nor seller held to have standing to seek injunctive relief,
although he had not requested such relief); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d
540 (2d Cir. 1967) (plaintiff need not be purchaser or seller in private suit for injunctive relief
from corporate mismanagement). For examples of other cases in which the purchaser-seller
requirement has been relaxed, see note 27 supra.
92. The Horst court did recognize the fact that Davis involved a claim only for injunctive
relief, but nevertheless considered the case to be "instructive" on the issue of causation in the
context of the instant case. See note 76 supra.
93. The Ohashi court required the plaintiff to show that the contract to purchase or sell
securities was still executory when the fraud occurred, and that the fraud "affected the un-
performed part of the bargain." Ohashi v. Verit Indus., 536 F.2d 849, 853, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1004 (1976). See notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text supra. The Horst court did not
expressly adopt the language of the latter part of this test. See notes 78-81 and accompanying
text supra. See also text accompanying note 95 infra.
94. The test employed in Davis was whether or not the allegedly fraudulent scheme suffi-
ciently "touched" the executory contract to purchase or sell securities as to be in connection
with a purchase or sale. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
95. See notes 78-81 and accompanying text supra.
96. See [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,466.
97. See notes 78-81 & 95 and accompanying text supra.
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of the test is to prove the existence of causation,9 8 it is submitted that the
test is not serving its intended purpose if it merely asks whether the defend-
ant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's damage.
It is suggested that the Horst court's well reasoned position on the issue
of standing to sue under rule 10b-5 based upon an oral contract to purchase or
sell securities could be persuasive authority for other courts presented with
the same issue. 99
It is not clear, however, what impact the court's decison on the causa-
tion issue will have, even within the Southern District of New York. This
view is founded upon the fact that the Horst opinion did not expressly indi-
cate whether its new formulation of the causation requirement is to be ap-
plied solely to situations in which the plaintiff alleges that a deceptive prac-
tice occurred during the pendency of an executory contract to purchase or
sell stock, or whether it is to have broader applicability. 1 00
Lisa S. Hunter
98. While the Second Circuit has stated that all of the elements of common law fraud need
not be required for a 10b-5 cause of action, see note 43 supra, the Horst court nevertheless
indicated that its test was intended to satisfy the policy underlying the traditional reliance
test-insuring a causal relationship between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's injury. See
notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra.
99. See notes 82-88 and accompanying text supra.
100. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,466.
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